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Introduction
The economic, institutional, technological and environmental dimensions of agriculture
shape and are shaped by patterns of agricultural information flow. Agro-food have motivated
academic analysts, commercial agents, and public administrators to attempt to better understand
agricultural economic information systems. At the most general level, the overarching research
and policy questions are focused on identifying and taking advantage of existing and emerging
public and private sector complementarities. The incentives and opportunities for private
investment in some dimensions of information production and provision are rising due to
structural, organizational and technological change (Wolf 1998, Boehlje 1994). Moreover,  with
a decline in government control of the agricultural economy (Bonnano et al.), there is value in
developing a more detailed understanding of the structure and function of information systems.
In this paper, we explore agricultural economic information systems from theoretical and
empirical perspectives. We use our data to illustrate how demand for information is affected by
the different types of positions individuals occupy in the collective agricultural production
process. To better understand who is providing what information to whom, we partition the
composite information supply through identification of the specific contributions of the various
types of public and private organizations. To complement our data, we use simple economic
theory to guide interpretations of our results.
Theoretical Foundation
We postulate that boundedly rational decision-makers in the market for information
behave so as to maximize quasi-rents to information.  More specifically they solve
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where P is the quasi-rent function of information, I is amount of information purchased, H is2
human capital, t is time used in the decision-making process, t is the time constraint for the
decision,  PI  is the price of one unit of information, S  is the scale of the firm making the
decision,  D(×) is the quality of decision measured on the unit interval with D(×) equal to one for
the best decision and zero for the worst, z is the level of readability of the information
considered.  A higher z will represent a more easily read piece of information. This is a short run
model, and thus human capital and scale are not endogenous to the firms decision.  This problem
would be solved by some I
* such that:
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We now turn to a discussion of the variables in our model.  Schultz (1975) argued that
differences in capacity to process information is a major source of variation in human capital.
This difference in human capital is an important type of exclusion in information markets.
Therefore, one way to differentiate information on the same subject is by how easy it is to
understand.  A large firm may have the human capital to diagnose huge matrices of numbers to
make production decisions, while small farms may need something more prescriptive to make
the same decision.  A small farmer may hire a consultant or may subscribe to an agricultural
newsletter that compiles advice for the farmer.
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This proposition basically tells us that if both prescriptive and non-prescriptive
information exists on the market, firms can, in a sense, “rent” human capital in the short run, by
purchasing the more prescriptive information.   On the other hand, firms that have high human
capital can generate positive information rents from technical information; however, at high
levels of readability, the high human capital firms may have information rents that are lower than3
the low human capital firms because the high human capital firms must pay wages and fixed
costs for its in-house analysts.  The low human capital firm does not have these costs.
We have also included time as a constraint on the firms decision.  The same piece of
information may be provided through different sources at varying frequencies.  One magazine
might publish monthly statistics that are also printed weekly in a competing newspaper.  Firms
may have varying time constraints for making a decision and may be led to one source versus
another solely on account of frequency.  The time constraint will also play a role in the firms
choice of readable versus technical information.
Hypothesis 2:  a low z will imply that  0
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Intuitively, the firm with more time to make a decision is able to take time necessary to
understand and interpret the more technical data and obtain positive information rents.  Again the
firm with less time must use more prescriptive information to obtain information rents.
Information sources, as we have discussed, may carry the same message, but with different
attributes.  We have shown how time constraints and level of readability can influence a firms
choice of information.  Other attributes one might consider are geographic specificity or the
formal or informal nature of the information.  We define informal information as information
that one cannot buy with money, but must spend time in finding this information through
conversations.   In the absence of a market for a certain kind of information a firm might be
driven to recover the information through conversations with customers, or even competitors.  It
could also be that a firm after obtain formal information will use informal means to check the
accuracy of their information.  In this way the informal information could increase the value of
marginal product (VMP) of the formal information.  In other words two information sources may
produce information that are compliments or substitutes.4
There are several differences between formal and informal information.  Formal
information will usually be very easy to understand and use, but with some loss of accuracy or
completeness. When a firm shops for formal information it is able to know exactly what types of
information are included.  When on the market for informal it is hard to tell how much or what
types of information will be recovered, you must decide how much time to spend.  Despite the
possibility of  informal and formal information being complements the time constraint forces
firms to choose judiciously  the amounts of each it will employ.
We may also divide information into public and private sources. Again here we allow for
the possibility of public information being a complement or a substitute for private information.
For example, if public information is perceived to be more accurate and unbiased but less timely
and situation specific, it can be used as a benchmark to assess and improve the quality of the
more timely commercial information. USDA reports on supply and demand conditions are often
used as a benchmark for quality and speculators will often expend resources to forecast these
reports before their release.  Public information, like informal information does not cost money,
but time.  However, unlike informal information it is often very technical, comprehensive, but
hard to digest.  Thus those with low human capital will have a harder time making use of public
information and may tend more towards private information.
Data and Analysis
1
Data versus Information Inputs
As table 1. indicates, there are clear distinctions between the various classes of actors in
the percentage of information versus data used.  In particular we find that endusers use a higher
proportion of information (56%) than do intermediaries (50%).  These percentages are
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statistically significantly different from each other at the a=.01 level of significance.   We would
expect to see this pattern, as intermediaries tended to have a higher level of education, and, in
accord with hypothesis 1, should therefore use more data ceteris peribus.  Moreover, we find that
farm-level producers are heavier users of information than are those further downstream the
production chain.  This again could be very easily explained using the education levels of the
respondents.
Table 1. Data and information inputs of endusers and intermediaries
Data and information inputs – endusers
Endusers Obs. % Data
Input
%
Information
Input
SD
Wheat farmers 6 .26 .74 .13
Wheat elevator 8 .34 .66 .55
Wheat exporters 5 .25 .75 .13
Potato grower/packer/shippers 6 .39 .61 .13
Potato processors 5 .45 .55 .22
Hog farmers 3 .35 .65 .18
Hog processors 4 .61 .39 .25
Hog input suppliers 2 .60 .40 .14
Tomato growers 2 .20 .80 .14
Tomato grower/packer/shippers 6 .37 .63 .20
Tomato input supplier 5 .37 .63 .20
Banks 24 .49 .51 .20
Misc. end users 13 .53 .47 .17
Total 89 .44 .56 .19
Data and information inputs – Intermediaries
Intermediaries Obs. %Data
Input
%
Information
Input
SD
Brokers 9 .53 .47 .26
Commodity associations 23 .47 .53 .24
Agricultural media 19 .30 .70 .15
Non-agricultural media 3 .43 .57 .21
Commercial vendors 30 .53 .47 .25
Extension 38 .60 .40 .22
In-house analysts 5 .57 .43 .11
Misc. intermediaries 3 .52 .48 .43
Total 130 .50 .50 .21
Despite education being highly correlated with percent data input, this variable does not appear
to explain the total variation.  It appears that tomato farmers use much more information than do
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Empirical Assessment”, Report to USDA-ERS, available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~just/ERS.pdf6
hog farmers.  We surveyed only tomato growers selling to the fresh tomato market.  Their goods
are very perishable, and have a short growing season.  Hogs, on the other hand, take a full year to
mature, and can be frozen nearly indefinitely before use.  Because hog farmers have more time to
make their decisions, they are able to make more use of data.
Also the very nature of the decisions being made could determine the optimal mix of data
and information.  Because each group must make different kinds of decisions we expect to see
different information seeking behaviors on the part of each group.   Besides time, education and
the nature of the decision to be made, availability of data (or information) may also drive some
of our results.
To illustrate the separate effects of education, commodity, and position in commodity
chain, we used least squares to estimate the following equation:
ln
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Data
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Here Data is the percent data input, Info is the percent info input.  All other variables are dummy
variables, HS is 1 if the respondent completed high school, Col is 1 if the individual completed
some college, Grad is 1 if the individual completed some graduate school.  The variables Wheat,
Potato, Hog  take on a one if the individual is involved in the market for wheat, potatoes or hogs
respectively.  The variable IS takes the value 1 if the respondent is an input supplier, PE takes the
value 1 if the individual is a processor or exporter, and Int takes the value 1 if the individual is an
information intermediary.  In this regression the base case is that of a tomato farmer who has not
completed high school.  We present the results of this regression in table 2.  From table 2 we find
that those involved in wheat and potatoes use significantly less data than do tomato farmers.
These two commodities are considered staples, and the markets for these commodities less
volatile than that for tomatoes.  Although not significant, those in the market for hogs also use7
less data than those in the tomato market.  Here we also find that input suppliers use more data,
as do information intermediaries, holding all else constant.  It appears also that completing
college has the largest impact on data use of any level of education.  This difference is not
significant when compared to those who have not completed high school, but it is when
compared to those who have.  Our sample contained only four respondents with no high school
education, and these respondents all reported very high levels of data use, thus they may be
reasonably ignored.
Table 2. Data and information use.
Data and information use—ANOVA                                    R
2=.11
Variable Parameter t-statistic
Intercept 0.310 0.554
High School -0.574 -0.997
College 0.244 1.271
Graduate School 0.041 0.186
Wheat -0.593 -2.472
Potato -0.652 -2.453
Hogs -0.338 -1.468
Input Supplier 0.454 1.568
Processors/Exporters 0.254 0.723
Information Intermediary 0.255 1.113
Public versus Private Information Use.
We now turn to a similar analysis of the use of public versus private information.  Our
results show that public information sources have a very specific audience.  Table 3. Shows that
endusers use a much higher percentage of private information (70%) than do intermediaries
(55%).  Again these means are significantly different at the a=.01 level of significance.  Within
the class of intermediaries, only extension agents are themselves considered a public source of
information.  Of interest here is that extension agents report the highest percentage use of public
information.  This may simply be the fact that extensions agents often exchange information
amongst themselves.  In fact we observed that intermediaries almost always listed sources of
information that fell into their own category (i.e. commodity associations received information8
from other commodity associations etc.).
Table 3.  Percent public versus private information inputs.
Public and private information use by endusers
Endusers Obs. % Public
Information
% Private
Information
SD
Wheat farmers 6 .39 .61 .26
Wheat elevators 8 .30 .70 .21
Wheat exporters 5 .16 .84 .16
Potato grower/packer/shippers 7 .30 .70 .19
Potato processors 5 .28 .72 .41
Hog farmers 3 .27 .73 .29
Hog processors 4 .34 .66 .26
Hog input suppliers 2 .45 .55 .21
Tomato growers 2 .05 .95 .07
Tomato grower/packer/shippers 6 .28 .72 .17
Tomato input suppliers 5 .39 .61 .17
Banks 24 .34 .66 .17
Misc. end users 13 .38 .62 .33
Total 90 .30 .70 .22
Public and private information use by intermediaries
Obs. % Public
Information
% Private
Information
SD
Brokers 9 .34 .66 .32
Commodity associations 24 .43 .57 .21
Agricultural media 19 .43 .57 .18
Non-agricultural media 3 .52 .48 .23
Commercial vendors 30 .41 .59 .27
Extension/LGU 36 .63 .37 .26
In-house analysts 5 .29 .71 .16
Misc. intermediaries 3 .58 .42 .33
Total intermediaries 129 .45 .55 .26
Among endusers, farmers generally use less public information.  Wheat farmers are an
exception to this, and report higher levels of public information use than do wheat elevators or
exporters. This may be caused by the availability of information specific to the farmers needs.
Public information is usually created for a wide range of purposes, and may be hard for decision
makers with fewer resources to make use of.  In the case of wheat there was one particular
extension agent in Washington who was well known.  This agent is a major source of
information for all involved in this particular wheat market because of the specificity of his
information.
We will also compare public versus private information use using a regression similar to9
that in the previous section:
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Here Public is the percentage of information used which is public in nature, and Private
is the percentage that is private.  All other variables are as before.  We report the results in table
4.  Despite all categories of information actors reporting use of public information, it appears that
public information has a very narrow target audience.  Information intermediaries use
significantly more public information than do endusers.  This is not hard to understand as public
information is general purpose, and intermediaries are able to process the public information so it
is digestible by a much smaller target audience.  While the genericity of public information
makes it useful to information intermediaries, it also restricts access by many of the endusers.
We find that having some graduate school significantly enhances ones use of public information.
This suggests that public information is (intentionally or unintentionally) targetted to the very
educated.  The intermediaries tend to hire those who are educated to gather this information and
process it so as to make it digestible for a specific subgroup of endusers.  We also find that those
involved in potatoes use less public information.  Again this may be attributed solely to
availability of  public information dealing with potatoes.
Table 4.
Use of Public and Private Information –ANOVA                 R
2=.13
Variable Parameter t-statistic
Intercept -0.692 -1.041
High School -0.209 -0.306
College -0.064 -0.281
Graduate School 0.542 2.053
Wheat 0.038 0.135
Potato -0.444 -1.408
Hogs 0.041 0.149
Input Supplier 0.159 0.464
Processors/Exporters -0.242 -0.582
Information Intermediary 0.726 2.67210
Formal versus Informal Information Use.
There are also several factors which may explain the use of formal versus informal information
for decision support.  By nature informal information is almost always more prescriptive than
formal.  Thus we expect some correlation between percent formal use and level of education.
We may also expect that informal information is used when formal information channels do not
exist to support decisions among some class of decision-makers.  We also expect to see informal
information use to be heavier in some commodities than in others.  Again here, it appear that
intermediaries use more formal information (72%) than do endusers (48%). This difference is
significant at the a=.01 level of significance. We also see high levels of informal information
used in potatoes and tomatoes. Generally it also appears that decision-makers on the level of
grower tend to make much more use of informal information.
Table 5. Formal and informal information use.
Formal and informal information use by endusers
Obs. % Formal % Informal SD
Wheat farmers 6 .54 .46 .23
Wheat elevators 8 .55 .45 .22
Wheat exporters 5 .45 .55 .31
Potato grower/packer/shippers 7 .26 .74 .16
Potato processors 5 .36 .64 .13
Hog farmers 3 .78 .22 .10
Hog processors 4 .40 .60 .12
Hog input suppliers 2 .40 .60 28
Tomato growers 2 .35 .65 .35
Tomato grower/packer/shippers 6 .31 .69 .12
Tomato input suppliers 5 .50 .50 .16
Banks 24 .60 .40 .20
Misc. End users 13 .68 .32 .26
Total 90 .48 .52 .34
Formal and informal information use by intermediaries
Obs. % Formal % Informal SD
Brokers 9 .79 .21 .13
Commodity associations 24 .69 .31 .21
Agricultural media 19 .77 .23 .21
Non-agricultural media 3 .47 .53 .25
Commercial info. vendor 30 .70 .30 .23
Extension 37 .72 .28 .19
In-house analysts 4 .78 .22 .16
Misc. intermediaries 3 .88 .12 .08
Total 129 .72 .28 .1811
To see these differences more clearly we have estimated the equation:
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Where  Formal is the percentage of information used that is formal, and Informal is the
percentage of information used that is informal.  The results are presented in table 6.  It appears
that education has somewhat to do with use of formal information as we predicted, but the
strongest effects are seen to be caused by commodity and position in the information chain.
Those involved in potatoes seem to use significantly more informal information.  Again this
might be explained by the lack of good formal information dealing with potatoes.  Information
intermediaries use significantly more formal information. It may be that endusers are less willing
to buy information from intermediaries who use large amounts of informal information.  It may
also be that in markets where public information is not available, intermediaries are not able to
take advantage of free public information together with the discrepancy  in human capital.  In
general informal information is easy to understand and therefore it is hard for intermediaries to
add value by processing.
Table 6.
Formal and informal use –ANOVA                                     R
2=.23
Variable Parameter t-statistic
Intercept -0.628 -1.051
High School 1.038 1.691
College -0.072 -0.353
Graduate School 0.279 1.178
Wheat 0.010 0.037
Potato -0.964 -3.406
Hogs -0.147 -0.599
Input Supplier 0.136 0.442
Processors/Exporters -0.240 -0.642
Information Intermediary 0.863 3.53712
Conclusions
We have seen that there are many factors which can affect one’s demand for information.
Among those that we have demonstrated were human capital, and position within a production or
information chain.  Those who ultimately use the information have very different needs.  Some
commodities may have markets that behave in completely different ways.  These different
markets will require that different types of information be used in making decisions within the
separate commodities.  Further, there are different jobs within each commodity chain which can
require completely different qualities and attributes of information.  Still even within the same
job, there may be differences in abilities and understanding which lead an actor to choose a
specific type of information.
Heterogeneity is not exclusive to those who make the end decisions.  There are not only
differences between information intermediaries and endusers, but also within the class of
intermediaries.  Some types of intermediaries seem better suited to providing information for a
particular audience.  One could conclude that comparative advantage seems to drive some types
of information through certain channels.  Some have argued that government provision of
information drives private information providers out of business, and undermines the market
mechanism.  It seems, however, that government rather provides the very general information
input, that is used by the private information providers to bring a specialized piece of information
to a specific audience.  The heterogeneity in demand for information allows information
suppliers to make a profit despite government providing information on the same topic for free.
Our results show that intermediaries rely heavily on the government for information, but
endusers do not.  This is strong evidence that the governments information does not drive private
information sources out of business, but rather makes their role economically viable.13
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